FILE / ScuroNeko/mtg

mtglib/internal/tls/fake/client_side.go

Исходный файл и его история в репозитории.
FILE 38abee7d7f796ffaf6716985a0dcc6c3fe4a8f1a
Files
mtg/mtglib/internal/tls/fake/client_side.go
T
appolimp 38abee7d7f Support fragmented TLS handshake records
DPI bypass tools like ByeDPI fragment a single TLS record into multiple
records to evade censorship. This broke ReadClientHello because it
assumed the entire ClientHello arrives in one TLS record.

Add reassembleTLSHandshake that reads continuation records and
reconstructs a single TLS record before parsing and HMAC verification.
Per RFC 5246 Section 6.2.1, handshake messages may be fragmented
across multiple records — this is valid TLS behavior.
2026-04-01 09:05:24 +03:00

416 lines
12 KiB
Go

package fake
import (
"bytes"
"crypto/hmac"
"crypto/sha256"
"crypto/subtle"
"encoding/binary"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"net"
"slices"
"time"
"github.com/9seconds/mtg/v2/mtglib/internal/tls"
)
const (
TypeHandshakeClient = 0x01
RandomLen = 32
// record_type(1) + version(2) + size(2) + handshake_type(1) + uint24_length(3) + client_version(2)
RandomOffset = 1 + 2 + 2 + 1 + 3 + 2
sniDNSNamesListType = 0
// maxContinuationRecords limits the number of continuation TLS records
// that reassembleTLSHandshake will read. This prevents resource exhaustion
// from adversarial fragmentation.
maxContinuationRecords = 10
)
var (
emptyRandom = [RandomLen]byte{}
extTypeSNI = [2]byte{}
)
type ClientHello struct {
Random [RandomLen]byte
SessionID []byte
CipherSuite uint16
}
func ReadClientHello(
conn net.Conn,
secret []byte,
hostname string,
tolerateTimeSkewness time.Duration,
) (*ClientHello, error) {
if err := conn.SetReadDeadline(time.Now().Add(ClientHelloReadTimeout)); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("cannot set read deadline: %w", err)
}
defer conn.SetReadDeadline(resetDeadline) //nolint: errcheck
// This is how FakeTLS is organized:
// 1. We create sha256 HMAC with a given secret
// 2. We dump there a whole TLS frame except of the fact that random
// is filled with all zeroes
// 3. Digest is computed. This digest should be XORed with
// original client random
// 4. New digest should be all 0 except of last 4 bytes
// 5. Last 4 bytes are little endian uint32 of UNIX timestamp when
// this message was created.
reassembled, err := reassembleTLSHandshake(conn)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("cannot reassemble TLS records: %w", err)
}
handshakeCopyBuf := &bytes.Buffer{}
reader := io.TeeReader(reassembled, handshakeCopyBuf)
// Skip the TLS record header (validated during reassembly).
// The header still flows through TeeReader into handshakeCopyBuf for HMAC.
if _, err = io.CopyN(io.Discard, reader, tls.SizeHeader); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("cannot skip tls header: %w", err)
}
reader, err = parseHandshakeHeader(reader)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("cannot parse handshake header: %w", err)
}
hello, err := parseHandshake(reader)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("cannot parse handshake: %w", err)
}
sniHostnames, err := parseSNI(reader)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("cannot parse SNI: %w", err)
}
if !slices.Contains(sniHostnames, hostname) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("cannot find %s in %v", hostname, sniHostnames)
}
digest := hmac.New(sha256.New, secret)
// we write a copy of the handshake with client random all nullified.
digest.Write(handshakeCopyBuf.Next(RandomOffset))
handshakeCopyBuf.Next(RandomLen)
digest.Write(emptyRandom[:])
digest.Write(handshakeCopyBuf.Bytes())
computed := digest.Sum(nil)
for i := range RandomLen {
computed[i] ^= hello.Random[i]
}
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(emptyRandom[:RandomLen-4], computed[:RandomLen-4]) != 1 {
return nil, ErrBadDigest
}
timestamp := int64(binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(computed[RandomLen-4:]))
createdAt := time.Unix(timestamp, 0)
if tdiff := time.Since(createdAt).Abs(); tdiff > tolerateTimeSkewness {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("timestamp %q is too old %s", createdAt, tdiff)
}
return hello, nil
}
// reassembleTLSHandshake reads one or more TLS records from conn,
// validates the record type and version, and reassembles fragmented
// handshake payloads into a single TLS record.
//
// Per RFC 5246 Section 6.2.1, handshake messages may be fragmented
// across multiple TLS records. DPI bypass tools like ByeDPI use this
// to evade censorship.
//
// The returned buffer contains the full TLS record (header + payload)
// so that callers can include the header in HMAC computation.
func reassembleTLSHandshake(conn io.Reader) (*bytes.Buffer, error) {
header := [tls.SizeHeader]byte{}
if _, err := io.ReadFull(conn, header[:]); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("cannot read record header: %w", err)
}
length := int64(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(header[3:]))
payload := &bytes.Buffer{}
if _, err := io.CopyN(payload, conn, length); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("cannot read record payload: %w", err)
}
if header[0] != tls.TypeHandshake {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unexpected record type %#x", header[0])
}
if header[1] != 3 || header[2] != 1 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unexpected protocol version %#x %#x", header[1], header[2])
}
// Reassemble fragmented payload. continuationCount caps the total
// number of continuation records across both phases below.
continuationCount := 0
// Phase 1: read continuation records until we have at least the
// 4-byte handshake header (type + uint24 length) to determine the
// expected total size.
for ; payload.Len() < 4 && continuationCount < maxContinuationRecords; continuationCount++ {
prevLen := payload.Len()
if err := readContinuationRecord(conn, payload); err != nil {
payload.Truncate(prevLen) // discard partial data on error
if errors.Is(err, io.EOF) || errors.Is(err, io.ErrUnexpectedEOF) {
break // no more records — let downstream parsing handle what we have
}
return nil, err
}
}
// Phase 2: we know the expected handshake size — read remaining
// continuation records until the payload is complete.
if payload.Len() >= 4 {
p := payload.Bytes()
expectedTotal := 4 + (int(p[1])<<16 | int(p[2])<<8 | int(p[3]))
if expectedTotal > 0xFFFF {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("handshake message too large: %d bytes", expectedTotal)
}
for ; payload.Len() < expectedTotal && continuationCount < maxContinuationRecords; continuationCount++ {
if err := readContinuationRecord(conn, payload); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
}
if payload.Len() < expectedTotal {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("cannot reassemble handshake: too many continuation records")
}
payload.Truncate(expectedTotal)
}
if payload.Len() > 0xFFFF {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("reassembled payload too large: %d bytes", payload.Len())
}
// Reconstruct a single TLS record with the reassembled payload.
result := &bytes.Buffer{}
result.Grow(tls.SizeHeader + payload.Len())
result.Write(header[:3])
binary.Write(result, binary.BigEndian, uint16(payload.Len())) //nolint:errcheck // bytes.Buffer.Write never fails
result.Write(payload.Bytes())
return result, nil
}
// readContinuationRecord reads the next TLS record header and appends its
// full payload to dst. It returns an error if the record is not a handshake
// record.
func readContinuationRecord(conn io.Reader, dst *bytes.Buffer) error {
nextHeader := [tls.SizeHeader]byte{}
if _, err := io.ReadFull(conn, nextHeader[:]); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("cannot read continuation record header: %w", err)
}
if nextHeader[0] != tls.TypeHandshake {
return fmt.Errorf("unexpected continuation record type %#x", nextHeader[0])
}
if nextHeader[1] != 3 || nextHeader[2] != 1 {
return fmt.Errorf("unexpected continuation record version %#x %#x", nextHeader[1], nextHeader[2])
}
nextLength := int64(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(nextHeader[3:]))
if nextLength == 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("zero-length continuation record")
}
if _, err := io.CopyN(dst, conn, nextLength); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("cannot read continuation record payload: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
func parseHandshakeHeader(r io.Reader) (io.Reader, error) {
// type(1) + size(3 / uint24)
// 01 - handshake message type 0x01 (client hello)
// 00 00 f4 - 0xF4 (244) bytes of client hello data follows
header := [1 + 3]byte{}
if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, header[:]); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("cannot read handshake header: %w", err)
}
if header[0] != TypeHandshakeClient {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("incorrect handshake type: %#x", header[0])
}
// unfortunately there is not uint24 in golang, so we just reust header
header[0] = 0
length := int64(binary.BigEndian.Uint32(header[:]))
buf := &bytes.Buffer{}
_, err := io.CopyN(buf, r, length)
return buf, err
}
func parseHandshake(r io.Reader) (*ClientHello, error) {
// A protocol version of "3,3" (meaning TLS 1.2) is given.
header := [2]byte{}
if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, header[:]); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("cannot read client version: %w", err)
}
hello := &ClientHello{}
if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, hello.Random[:]); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("cannot read client random: %w", err)
}
if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, header[:1]); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("cannot read session ID length: %w", err)
}
hello.SessionID = make([]byte, int(header[0]))
if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, hello.SessionID); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("cannot read session id: %w", err)
}
if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, header[:]); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("cannot read cipher suite length: %w", err)
}
cipherSuiteLen := int64(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(header[:]))
// we do not care about picking up any cipher. we pick the first one,
// so it is always should be present.
if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, header[:]); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("cannot read first cipher suite: %w", err)
}
hello.CipherSuite = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(header[:])
if _, err := io.CopyN(io.Discard, r, cipherSuiteLen-2); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("cannot skip remaining cipher suites: %w", err)
}
if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, header[:1]); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("cannot read compression methods length: %w", err)
}
if _, err := io.CopyN(io.Discard, r, int64(header[0])); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("cannot skip compression methods: %w", err)
}
return hello, nil
}
func parseSNI(r io.Reader) ([]string, error) {
header := [2]byte{}
if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, header[:]); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("cannot read length of TLS extensions: %w", err)
}
extensionsLength := int64(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(header[:]))
buf := &bytes.Buffer{}
buf.Grow(int(extensionsLength))
if _, err := io.CopyN(buf, r, extensionsLength); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("cannot read extensions: %w", err)
}
for buf.Len() > 0 {
// 00 00 - assigned value for extension "server name"
// 00 18 - 0x18 (24) bytes of "server name" extension data follows
// 00 16 - 0x16 (22) bytes of first (and only) list entry follows
// 00 - list entry is type 0x00 "DNS hostname"
// 00 13 - 0x13 (19) bytes of hostname follows
// 65 78 61 ... 6e 65 74 - "example.ulfheim.net"
// 00 00 - assigned value for extension "server name"
extTypeB := buf.Next(2)
if len(extTypeB) != 2 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("cannot read extension type: %v", extTypeB)
}
// 00 18 - 0x18 (24) bytes of "server name" extension data follows
lengthB := buf.Next(2)
if len(lengthB) != 2 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("cannot read extension %v length: %v", extTypeB, lengthB)
}
length := int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(lengthB))
extDataB := buf.Next(length)
if len(extDataB) != length {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("cannot read extension %v data: len %d != %d", extTypeB, length, len(extDataB))
}
if !bytes.Equal(extTypeB, extTypeSNI[:]) {
continue
}
buf.Reset()
buf.Write(extDataB)
// 00 16 - 0x16 (22) bytes of first (and only) list entry follows
lengthB = buf.Next(2)
if len(lengthB) != 2 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("cannot read the length of the SNI record: %v", lengthB)
}
length = int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(lengthB))
if length == 0 {
return nil, nil
}
listType, err := buf.ReadByte()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("cannot read SNI list type: %w", err)
}
// 00 - list entry is type 0x00 "DNS hostname"
if listType != sniDNSNamesListType {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("incorrect SNI list type %#x", listType)
}
names := []string{}
for buf.Len() > 0 {
// 00 13 - 0x13 (19) bytes of hostname follows
lengthB = buf.Next(2)
if len(lengthB) != 2 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("incorrect length of the hostname: %v", lengthB)
}
length = int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(lengthB))
name := buf.Next(length)
if len(name) != length {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("incorrect length of SNI hostname: len %d != %d", length, len(name))
}
names = append(names, string(name))
}
return names, nil
}
return nil, nil
}